In this essay I illustrate the theory of hard incompatibilism and its implications within the metaphysical debate about free will and the nature of our humanity. I also attempt to illustrate the consequences a view of hard incompatibilism may have on our ideas of freedom and moral responsibility. Some of these ideas originated with the pre-Socratic philosophers, and the ongoing debate is not at all exhaustively dull, or for that matter, all conclusively solved.
The viewpoint of this essay assumes, and with limited conclusiveness, that hard incompatibilism is true, and indicates that casual determinism and our traditional conceptions of free will are incompatible. The primary target of my argument—and this is my thesis—is to argue that hard incompatibilism is a viable perspective for living a good life; that we are not ultimately responsible for our actions, and, despite this, we retain a sense of individual freedom and accountability. We can still have authentic and meaningful lives.